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Japan has undergone significant changes both in domestic politics and foreign policy since the end 
of the Cold War. They in effect have encouraged Japan toward greater participation in international 
security, re-vitalization of the US-Japan alliance, and a new strategy of East Asian community 
building. The new global strategy of the Bush administration and changing strategic landscapes in 
East Asia complicate Japan’s coping strategy, but also provide an opportunity for Japan’s new 
engagement strategy in the region. 
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Many external observers have seen Japan’s growing eagerness to play an active role in the post-Cold 
War era as reflecting its ambition to become a “normal” great power, including in the military 
domain.  Along this line of argument, many characterize the nature of Japan’s changes as a move 
toward the “right,” and predict an intensifying Sino-Japanese rivalry, both economic and geopolitical, 
as a central component of an East Asian order in coming decades.  There, however, is a huge 
disconnect between these perceptions, on the one hand, and the nature of changes Japan has been 
undergoing since the end of the Cold War, on the other. 
One of the major characteristics of Japan’s postwar diplomacy has been the lack of intention and 
preparedness to play high politics as a traditional great power.    Japan’s fundamental reference point 
in security policy has thus always been the alliance with the United States, and this basic premise has 
not changed, or has been even strengthened, after the end of the Cold War.  Consequently, Japan 
has re-affirmed the importance of its alliance with the United States in the 1990s, and simultaneously 
has made difficult efforts to take part in multilateral security cooperation in maintaining international 
peace and stability. 
For many observers, including those in Japan, it has not been easy to appreciate this basic nature 
of Japan’s responses to the end of the Cold War, because the demise of the Cold War and domestic 
changes have released the Japanese from some of the long-standing post-War taboos, including the 
debate on the revision of the Article of the postwar Constitution.  As a result, nationalist or even 
somewhat rightist voices, which used to stand on the defensive against the dominant pacifism, have 
become louder. 
The net effect of this phenomenon, however, has been mixed at best.  For one thing, with the 
change in the context of political discourse on security and external affairs, the debate on the need of 
national defense has intensified.    There has not been a credible indication, however, that traditional 
nationalists have taken control of the security policy making process, not to mention the final output 
of policy, although they have clearly become important factors to be taken account of in the process   ３
of decision making. 
This paper argues that a more conspicuous change has occurred in Japan’s security policy since 
the end of the Cold War in the form of a steady progress toward greater participation in the domain 
of international security and a regional strategy of building an East Asian community.  Domestic 
changes in Japan’s foreign policy parameters, although some of which may indeed be associated 
with the surge of nationalism of a kind, have in effect prompted Japanese deeper engagement in 
regional and global affairs. 
With this perspective in mind, this paper will examine the meanings of Japan’s domestic changes 
during the last decade for its foreign policy, overview changing security landscapes in East Asia by 
highlighting the catalytic role played by the Bush strategy, and discuss recent developments of 
Japan’s regional strategy toward an East Asian community building. 
 
Japan’s Domestic Changes and Foreign Policy 
 
The end of the Cold War and the demise of the 1955 regime have changed the mode of Japanese 
debate and policy making in a fundamental way, although the substance of security policy has been 
changing only slowly and not much substantially.  The changes have taken place in four areas, 




In the domain of international security, the 1991 Gulf War became a critical turning point awakening 
the government to the new realities after the end of the Cold War.  The absolute humiliation 
resulting from the Japanese government’s incapacity, other than through “checkbook diplomacy,” to 
contribute to multinational efforts to defeat Iraq was a central driving force behind the enactment of 
the International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO Law) in June 1992. 
The passage of the law enabled the Japanese government to dispatch its Self-Defense Force (SDF) 
to the peace-keeping operations under the United Nations Transitional Authorities in Cambodia   ４
(UNTAC), which was followed by a series of dispatches of the SDF troops to a number of other UN 
PKOs including those in Zaire, the Golan Heights, and East Timor
１. 
As Japan was making this significant engagement in the domain of international security for the 
first time after the end of the World War II, the monopoly of power by the LDP was broken in 
August 1993 with the birth of the Morihiro Hosokawa government as an anti-LDP coalition. 
When the desperate LDP came back to power with the Socialist Party head Murayama as Prime 
Minister of an LPD-led coalition government in June 1994, Murayama recognized the 
constitutionality of SDF and the legitimacy of the U.S.-Japan alliance, thus destroying his party’s 
long-standing raison-d’etre.  This led to the catastrophic demise of the Socialist Party, and the 
collapse of the so-called 1955 regime. 
The demise of the leftist-pacifist political forces in domestic politics has changed the context of 
political discourse on security matters in a somewhat fundamental manner.  It was particularly 
significant that an overall change in domestic atmosphere lifted long-standing taboos on national and 
international security including the issue of the Article Nine of the Japanese postwar constitution. 
This phenomenon, however, was not necessarily an indication of Japan becoming “nationalistic” 
or “rightist” as many in Asia worried.  The initial change of significance had to do with Japanese 
growing awareness of the importance of international peace-keeping efforts.    Opinion polls indicate, 
for instance, that in the 1990s many Japanese have come to support the revision of the Article Nine 




The US-Japan Alliance 
 
Second, new regional and global security challenges after the end of the Cold War caused the 
re-affirmation of the US-Japan alliance.  The Clinton administration engaged in major 
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re-adjustment of the US strategy toward the Asia-Pacific as exemplified by the so-called “Nye 
initiative,” and Japan responded by the adoption of the revised Defense Program Outline (new Taiko) 
in November 1995. 
New Taiko stressed, among others, a new role of SDF in international peace-keeping efforts, and 
an important role of the U.S.-Japan alliance in these endeavors; it stated that “this close cooperative 
bilateral relationship based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, facilitates Japanese efforts for 
peace and stability of the international community, including promotion of regional multilateral 
security dialogues and cooperation, as well as support for various United Nations activities.”
３ 
Along this line of logic, the “US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security,” signed by Prime Minister 
Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton in April 1996, declared that “the Japan-U.S. security 
relationship …… remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for 
maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the 
twenty-first century.”
４ 
It is equally important to note that the re-affirmation of the alliance took place against the 
backdrop of the North Korean crisis in 1994.  The crisis came on the verge of military conflict, 
which was saved by the Carter visit at the last minute, leading to the Geneva agreement which 
established the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in exchange for the North Korean 
commitment to freeze its nuclear programs
５. 
This crisis led to the subsequent revision of the 1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between 
the United States and Japan, which materialized in 1997.  The new Guidelines meticulously 
delineated what Japan constitutionally and legally can and cannot do in the form of cooperating with 
the United States in the event of a regional contingency.  The nightmare at the time for both 
Washington and Tokyo was Japanese inaction toward a possible Korean contingency, in which event, 
many American argued, the alliance would be over.    The drafting of the new Guidelines, therefore, 
was in essence was an attempt to save the US-Japan alliance. 
                                            
３ “National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996,” (November 28, 1995). Available at: 
http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou/index_e.htm 
４ “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century” (April 17, 1996).  
Available at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html 




Third, the subsequent security threats posed by a series of North Korean provocations, such as 
intrusion by spy ships, the launch of the Teapodon missile, and the abduction of Japanese citizens, 
have steadily aroused many Japanese consciousness about its own national security. 
As a result, nationalist or even somewhat rightist voices, which used to stand on the defensive 
against the dominant pacifism, have become louder.  The net effect of this phenomenon, however, 
is mixed at best.    The case can be made that this represents a phenomenon that former taboos have 
now ceased to be taboos.  More importantly, this situation indicates that the political context of 
national security debate has shifted from the 1955 regime to something new. 
Here, the recent passage of the domestic emergency laws is indicative of a future framework of 
political debate.  For the Japanese, this is by no means a case of Japan shifting toward the right.  
Japan, like any other democratic sovereign states, should have been equipped with the laws a long 
time ago.  It is revealing that protection of civil and human rights under the emergency laws was 
the central point of contestation between the largest opposition party, Democratic Party, and the LDP 
coalition government. 
New domestic debate would be eventually tested over the issue of the revision of the Article Nine 
of the constitution.  A consensus in now forming among politicians that the Article Nine has 
increasingly become a liability for Japanese participation in multilateral security as well as for 
effective national security.  A real debate would occur when they begin to present alternative 




Fourth, in recent Japanese attitudes toward regional engagement, there is new enthusiasm toward 
regional integration and community building.    These efforts naturally entail structural adjustment to 
new regional dynamics centering around the rise of China and its various overtures toward East Asia.     ７
This will be elaborated further in the final section of this paper. 
 
Response to the 9.11 
 
As discussed, domestic changes in Japan’s foreign policy parameters during the last decade have 
accelerated Japan’s participation in international security including the United Nations PKOs. 
The development in this direction has been systematic and steady, while responses in the domain 
of traditional national security have been sporadic.  After all, the emphasis in the Ichiro Ozawa’s 
theory of Japan as a “normal country” was also placed more on Japan’s participation in international 
peace-keeping efforts than anything else. 
The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (the 9.11) have opened up a new 
chapter for Japan’s coping with international security.  Soon after the 9.11, the support of the 
international community for the United States was unmistakable.    China agreed to the UN Security 
Council resolution allowing the U.S.-led multinational forces to engage in a war in Afghanistan, 
which became the first instance where China voted for the use of force by UN members against a 
sovereign state.
６ 
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi also supported the United States unequivocally.  
This was a natural act from the standpoint of Japanese engagement in international security whose 
momentum has been steadily on the rise in the 1990s.  In fact, the anti-terrorism measures law, 
enacted speedily to dispatch Japanese SDF to logistical support in the Indian Ocean in the event of a 
war in Afghanistan, was legitimized in the name of the United Nations Charter and the relevant UN 
Security Council resolutions, and not the U.S.-Japan alliance.
７  Invoking the U.S.-Japan security 
treaty was impossible because the Japanese government has not recognized the right of collective 
self-defense as constitutional. 
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Here, the lesson from the 1991 Gulf War experiences was clearly at work.    The nightmare for the 
Japanese government was to repeat “checkbook diplomacy.”  Politically, the U.S. factor was not 
insignificant in the mind of central decision-makers, particularly Prime Minister Koizumi.  In the 
end, it was fortunate for the Japanese government that the support for the United States did not 
contradict contribution to international security at the time of the war in Afghanistan.    This was not 
necessarily the case regarding a war against Iraq, as discussed below. 
 
Bush Strategy and Northeast Asia 
 
Transforming the World 
 
The Bush strategy basically defines the U.S. national interests as the core, with the assumptions that 
the promotion of the U.S. national interests would lead to a better world and that the end of the Cold 
War has given the United States an opportunity to transform the world.  The U.S. would carry out 
this mission with available and effective means including the unilateral use of its dominant power.  
This conceptualization of global strategy has not fundamentally changed since Condoliza Rice 
presented the argument in her article in Foreign Affairs
８. 
Arguably, the US strategic objectives have been constant since the end of the Cold War.  The 
maintenance of a new global order after the Cold War has been of primary concern, and 
Washington’s determination not to allow any rising power to challenge the United States, either 
regionally or globally, has been strong.  The 1991 Gulf War represented the fist manifestation of 
such US global strategy in the post-Cold War era. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United has also regarded terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as main sources of threat to global stability as well as to its 
national security.  Throughout the 1990s, the US forward-deployed military presence has often 
become a target of terrorist attacks, many of which allegedly by the Al Quaida. 
And yet, the 9.11 proved to be a historic turning point, because it gave the Bush administration a 
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clear goal and a mission in a war against terrorism and those who harbor terrorism.  In this war 
against terrorism, which is likely to continue for several years or even longer, there are three distinct 
aspects influencing the Bush strategy. 
First, deep-seated in the mind of the Bush administration is the impulse of homeland defense and 
the determination not to allow another 9.11 at all cost. 
Second, the theater for homeland defense is nonetheless global.  The Bush global strategy now 
clearly targets the three-dimensional threat comprising terrorism, WMD and the rouge regimes.  
Also, counter-proliferation against WMD continues to constitute the central component of US 
strategy on the global theater.    This continues to fuel the Bush administration quest for the Missile 
Defense (MD) programs both globally and regionally. 
Third, the Bush administration has been pursuing US strategy with undisguised missionary zeal.  
Political rhetoric, pronounced primarily by President Bush himself, is universal, appealing to the 
basic cause of democracy and freedom as the core guiding principles for transforming the world. 
In applying these three components of strategy, the Bush administration in effect makes a 
conceptual distinction among three categories of states; allies, strategic competitors, and rogue states.   
These categories were explicit in the initial formulation of foreign policy of the Bush administration, 
and Northeast Asia embraces all three categories of states. 
A strategic competitor for the Unites States is a state having an alternative orientation to an 
international system including value issues, which have the innate inclination to challenge the 
system of U.S. predominance.  In essence, Chinese long-term thinking and geopolitical orientation 
make it such a competitor for the United States. 
Under normal circumstances, however, strategic competitors are interested in strategic 
co-existence, while remaining determined to defend their own core values and related interests.  
The current state of U.S.-China relations is characterized by such co-existence, which is likely to be 
sustained for some time to come. 
Allies are close friends of the United States sharing basic values and overall objectives of creating 
an international order with the United States as the central agent.  In Northeast Asia, Japan’s 
alliance-based strategy provides the cornerstone for the U.S. regional strategy.   １０
Rogue states, unlike strategic competitors, do not have the capability nor the intention to provide 
for an alternative international system, but could threaten the national security of the United States in 
various conventional and unconventional ways.  Rogue states are also sources of global instability 
when connected with the proliferation WMD.  North Korea represents such threat in Northeast 
Asia. 
Now, we will turn to the examination of developments regarding these three categories of states in 
the Northeast Asian security landscape, i.e., the US-Japan alliance, US-China strategic relations, and 
the North Korean problem. 
 
New Dilemma in the US-Japan Alliance 
 
The initial attempt by the core people in the Washington policy community, many of whom later 
assumed important positions in the Bush foreign policy team, was the so-called Armitage report, 
titled “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership
９”  Although the 
reality falls far short of the American expectation, the message was explicit in calling for a 
U.S.-Japan alliance more closely modeled on the U.S.-U.K. relationship. 
Implicit in the distinction between a strategic competitor and an ally was a frustration shared by 
the Bush foreign policy team about the Clinton administration’s lack of conceptual clarity in its 
policy toward the two critical countries in Northeast Asia.    Most problematically for the Bush team, 
the Clinton administration often confused a competitor for a partner, as exemplified by the 
declaration of a “strategic partnership” with China, at the cost of an alliance relationship with Japan.   
This conceptual clarity in the US strategy under the Bush administration is an important source of 
the good state of the alliance between the United States and Japan, which is often called the best 
since the end of the World War II. 
In the Bush global strategy, however, the expected role of allies has undergone a significant 
transformation.    The Bush strategy basically defines the U.S. national interests as the core, with the 
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assumptions that the promotion of the U.S. national interests would lead to a better world and that 
the end of the Cold War has given the United States an opportunity to transform the world.   Allies 
are expected to support and join this U.S. mission. 
This redefinition of the alliance for the Bush global strategy has changed the modality of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance.  Prime Minister Koizumi’s performance with President Bush has been quite 
effective under this new U.S. definition of the alliance relationship.  Koizumi in effect has been a 
cheer leader for the Bush global strategy.    This is why the chemistry between Bush and Koizumi is 
so good. 
The question remains, however, to what extent Koizumi is aware of this.    Perhaps not much.    If 
he was, he could have responded differently to the war in Afghanistan and the war against Iraq.  
While the war in Afghanistan was a clear case of international security, the case of the Iraq war was 
complicated at best. 
In one sense, opposition voiced by France and Germany voiced against the Bush policy to attack 
Iraq was meant to encourage the U.S. to behave prudently according to the norm of international 
cooperation.  The attack on Iraq was not the exercise of such leadership by the United States.  
France and Germany could engage in such diplomacy because they have their own forums of 
multilateral diplomacy based in Europe, as well as at the United Nations. 
In contrast, Japan does not have effective alternative tools with which to deal with the United 
States.  The Japanese government, too, was deeply annoyed by the unilateralism of the Bush 
administration to go to war against Iraq.    It, therefore, hoped that some U.N. resolution would to be 
passed justifying the U.S. action.  When time ran out, however, the Japanese government did not 
have any other means but to go along with the United States. 
Beneath the surface, therefore, the implications of the Japanese support for the war in Afghanistan 
and the support for the U.S. war against Iraq are significantly different.  The former was a clear 
case of international security recognized as such by the majority of the international community, 
whereas the latter was not.  The case of the Iraq war has revealed that when and where there is a 
gap between the role of the United States and the cause of international security, Japan would in the 
end have to follow the United States.   １２
The aftermath of the war against Iraq has thus revealed a basic dilemma for Japan’s participation 
in international security.  This dilemma, in turn, informs a motivation shared among Japanese 
policy makers toward community building efforts in East Asia, as argued below.   
 
US-China Strategic Co-existence 
 
As stated, the Bush administration in principle conceptualizes China as a “strategic competitor.”    It, 
however, stopped calling her as such soon after its inauguration.  Secretary of State Colin Powell 
for instance said in July 2001 on his way to Canberra from Beijing that “the relationship is so 
complex with so many different elements to it that it's probably wiser not to capture it with a single 
word or a single term or a single cliché.
１０” 
The 9.11 incident proved to provide a yet further foundation for strategic coexistence between the 
United States and China.  China played a critical role in the passage of the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1368, legitimizing a war in Afghanistan.  The United States does need a cooperative 
working relationship with China for the fight against terrorism, as well as concerning the North 
Korean problem. 
China, on its part, has stopped challenging the US predominance in the Asia-Pacific and the 
world in the late 1990s.    This has basically been the bottom-line of Chinese regional strategy since 
after the Taiwan crises in 1995 and 1996, when both Beijing and Washington sought to restore the 
relationship with the mutual visits by Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton in 1997 and 1998. 
In principle, Chinese regional and global strategy is founded upon its economy-centered 
orientation, making the most of its economic weight, both real and potential.    As a consequence, the 
Chinese government has been keeping a low profile toward the US security presence in the region, 
including the Taiwan question and the US-Japan alliance.  There is reasonable evidence to believe 
that China has also readjusted its policy toward Japan with the same strategic considerations in the 
summer of 1999, perhaps upon re-examining the effect of Jiang Zemin’s trip to Japan in 1998. 
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The strategic coexistence between Washington and Beijing, therefore, means the most critical 
great powers in the Asia-Pacific having different dreams in the same bed.  They have different 
strategic orientations, and they need each other precisely for the pursuit of their own strategies. 
The Taiwan question is now an object of such strategic coexistence.  Beijing basically 
maintained a low key against some of the initial provocative statements by President Bush, as well 
as the US policies of arms sale or allowing stopovers in the US by Taiwanese leaders including Chen 
Suibien himself. 
In order not to exacerbate the problem, the Bush administration has also re-committed itself to the 
principle of “one-China” and non-support of Taiwan “independence,” as President Bush himself has 
now come to pronounce
１１. 
In principle, the Taiwan question still remains a wild card for U.S.-China relations, which could 
upset their strategic coexistence.  Now, the Chinese economy-centered strategy appears to be 
working.  Taiwan’s economic dependence on China is ever deepening, which in turn gives 
confidence to Beijing which has been advancing its “united front” policy toward “comrades” in 
Taiwan. 
The Chen Suibien administration, however, has been taking mixed responses, legislating 
necessary measures for facilitating mutual trade, investment and travels, while increasing political 
concerns over the ever-deepening economic dependence on China.  The prospect for stable 
cross-strait relations could be clouded over the plan announced in November this year to hold 
national referendum in 2006. 
 
North Korean Problem 
 
In the State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, North Korea, Iran and Iraq, formerly labeled 
as rogue states, were upgraded to “an axis of evil.
１２”  The nature of North Korean threat as an 
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“evil” is three-dimensional, in line with the three aspects of the US strategy after the 9.11 as seen 
above. 
The first aspect has to do with the homeland defense of the United States.  Here, a potential 
threat posed by the Taepodon missile is relevant.    Other than this, however, North Korea has yet to 
represent a direct threat to the US homeland security, and perhaps this would account for the Bush 
administration’s different approaches between Iraq and North Korea.    In this sense, commitment to 
the six-party talks is not necessarily the ultimate choice for the Bush administration. 
Second, on the global theater, the proliferation of WMD is an urgent issue in dealing with North 
Korea.  Here, multinational endeavors, most notably the PSI, to stop inflows and outflows of 
nuclear-related materials and technology into and out of North Korea are important. 
Third, a missionary zeal, often pronounced by President Bush, makes the leadership regime in 
Pyongyang totally unacceptable for Washington, particularly for President Bush himself.  In this 
vein, President Bush has often expressed his sympathy and the need of massive assistance toward the 
people of North Korea.  This aspect of the US North Korean policy creates an impression that the 
Bush administration should be aiming at regime change in Pyongyang. 
This last aspect of the Bush policy toward North Korea, compounded by the rhetoric of an “axis 
of evil,” would have naturally aroused a strong sense of crisis for the leadership in Pyongyang.  
This perceived deep crisis for the regime survival even caused Kim Jong-il, the supreme leader of 
North Korea, to engage in a surprising move to accept Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
to Pyongyang in September 2002.  The determination on the part of Kim Jong-il to seek helping 
hands from Japan was unmistakable in Kim himself confessing and apologizing for the abduction of 
Japanese citizens and the spy ships
１３. 
When the gamble to normalize diplomatic relations with Japan stalled, however, Kim Jong-il 
once again faced, or did not have any other choice but to face the United States squarely in order to 
get the guarantee of the regime survival in one way or another.  In the face of President Bush 
whose stance has been uncompromising to begin with, however, Pyongyang had to employ 
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unusually provocative measures, playing a chicken game by climbing step by step the ladder of 
nuclear escalation. 
Against these escalation tactics of Pyongyang, the Bush administration once became inclined to 
go to the United Nations for sanctions.  Perhaps, this move alarmed China, which would account 
for the timing of Chinese shift in its diplomacy toward North Korea from the emphasis on bilateral 
talks between Washington and Pyongyang to a multilateral framework.  On top of this, worsening 
of the security environment and its apparent impact on the changing nature of security debate in 
Japan, as well as the nuclear programs of North Korea, are not welcome developments for Beijing. 
Pyongyang thus agreed to the six party talks held in Beijing in late August, 2003.  Under this 
framework, however, the US determination to demand Pyongyang to scrap its nuclear programs is 
still strong.  Accordingly, US expectations on China as a mediator could also wane depending on 
Chinese responses. 
Whatever would turn out to be the case, determinations of Washington to Pyongyang to pursue 
their own agenda head-on appear unchanged, and it may well be the case that a solution, if any, 
could only be found out of bad choices
１４. 
 
Toward Building an East Asian Community 
 
From Fukuda Doctrine to ASEAN 10 
 
In retrospect, the initial policy of the Japanese government, advanced with a view to building a 
regional order, was the so-called Fukuda Doctrine, announced in 1977 as a policy toward Southeast 
Asia.    Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda announced a three-point policy toward Southeast in Manila in 
August 1977.    First, Japan is committed to peace and is determined not to become a military power.   
Second, Japan will establish a “heart-to-heart” relationship of mutual trust with Southeast Asia 
beyond economics and politics.  Third, Japan will cooperate with ASEAN’s efforts to strengthen 
solidarity and resilience, nurture relations of mutual understanding with the Indochinese states, and 
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thus would contribute to peace and prosperity of the entire Southeast Asian region. 
The essence of the Fukuda Doctrine was the third point, aspiring to serve as a bridge between 
ASEAN and Indochina for peace and prosperity of the Southeast Asia region.  This principle 
remained to form the core thinking of Japan’s Southeast Asia policy during the subsequent years, 
which was revitalized at the time of the Cambodian peace process in the early 1990s, where Japan 
actively sought to play a political role
１５. 
Arguably, with the realization of ASEAN 10, the expressed political goal of the Fukuda Doctrine 
was achieved on ASEAN’s own initiative, sustained by substantial economic input by the Japanese 
ODA and private trade and FDI.  In early 1997, anticipating the birth of ASEAN 10, Japanese 
Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto proposed the Japan-ASEAN summit to further accelerate the 
integration of ASEAN as well as Japan’s relations with the ASEAN countries. 
 
From ASEAN+3 to Koizomi Proposal 
 
The realization of ASEAN 10, however, coincided with the Asian financial crisis, forcing ASEAN 
countries to go through a series of difficult efforts to restructure domestic economies and politics as 
well as regional arrangements.  Also, at about the same time, China has shifted its main strategic 
focus from high politics to low politics.  ASEAN, following its usual instinct to carefully balance 
relations with external powers, turned the Hashimoto proposal into its own initiative leading to the 
establishment of ASEAN+3 at the end of 1997. 
These developments have ushered in a new momentum toward deepening regional integration.  
Singapore took an important initiative to officially propose a free trade agreement (FTA) with Japan 
in December 1999 when Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong visited Japan.  Japanese economic 
ministries, most notably the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which had already 
started to study such arrangements with several countries including South Korea, responded 
positively and the negotiations gained momentum. 
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In the meantime, observing the momentum of a series of bilateral FTA initiatives and having 
achieved the goal of joining the WTO, China also came up with its own FTA initiative, as most 
symbolically indicated by the Chinese proposal of a free trade agreement with ASEAN at the 
occasion of the ASEAN+3 summit meeting in November 2000.    In the following year, Chinese and 
ASEAN leaders reached a basic agreement that they would achieve a free trade area within the 
coming 10 years.  This was quickly followed-up in November 2002, when the leaders signed a 
comprehensive framework agreement to carry out the plan. 
These China-ASEAN initiatives have prompted the Koizumi administration of Japan to develop 
its won regional strategy built upon the ongoing process of FTA negotiations.  In Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s policy speech delivered in Singapore in January 2002
１６, Koizumi proposed an “Initiative 
for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership,” built upon the “Japan-Singapore 
Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership,” the so-called Japan-Singapore FTA, which 
Koizumi signed prior to the speech. 
More importantly, the Koizumi proposal included an ambitious reference to an East Asian 
community.  Koizumi said to the audience in Singapore that “our goal should be the creation of a 
community that acts together and advances together.”  Koizumi expressed his expectation that, 
starting from Japan-ASEAN cooperation, “the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of 
Korea, Australia and New Zealand will be core members of such a community.” 
To substantiate such partnership with ASEAN, Koizumi speech advanced a new approach to 
Japanese diplomacy with ASEAN.    While stating his basic stance to promote policies of the Fukuda 
Doctrine, Koizumi mentioned that “in the quarter-century since the ‘Fukuda Speech,’ the global 
situation has undergone tremendous change.”    He then continued: 
 
In Southeast Asia, peace has progressed with the resolution of conflicts in Indochina, 
resulting in the expansion of ASEAN to ten countries.  Democratization and a 
market economy are also progressing in Asia.  The People's Republic of China and 
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Taiwan have joined the WTO.    Furthermore, as a result of the terrorist attacks on the 
United States, we've seen a paradigm shift in security concepts, making patently clear 
the importance of working together for the sake of peace and stability. 
 
In a nutshell, although Koizumi speech took the form of addressing Southeast Asian nations, it has 
made clear a comprehensive design of Japan’s regional engagement.  What was quietly implied in 





In December 2003, a bilateral ASEAN-Japan summit meeting was held in Tokyo.  This was the 
very first occasion when the ASEAN countries agreed to hold such a meeting outside of Southeast 
Asia.    Previously, any bilateral summit meeting between ASEAN and its non-member country used 
to be held in conjunction with the ASEAN leaders meetings or the ASEAN+3 meetings, which as a 
rule take place only in the Southeast Asian region. 
ASEAN has long been known for its balancing act vis-a-vis non-member external powers.  The 
fact that the ASEAN leaders now agreed to meet with their Japanese counterpart outside of 
Southeast Asia was an indication of their trust in Japan.  This, however, may have implied 
decreasing weight of Japan particularly as compared to that of China in recent years.  Namely, the 
presence of China has become so prominent for ASEAN that the holding of a bilateral summit with 
Japan would not upset its balanced diplomacy with outside powers. 
No matter what the motivation on the part of ASEAN, this was a golden opportunity for Japan to 
move toward a community building as an equal partner with ASEAN, without necessarily excluding 
China.  The joint communiqué of the summit and the action programs amply demonstrate this, so 
much so that the task left for the Japanese government is to implement these plans and a long-term 
strategy of East Asian community building. 
It has long been argued in the Japanese policy community that Japanese policy-makers feel most   １９
at ease with the ASEAN counterparts in Asia.  ASEAN people also now say that they feel most 
comfortable with Japan among the external countries.  This is clearly the result of extensive and 
rich contacts between the two during the last decades. 
The grounds of such optimism, however, could not be turned into assets unless approached 
strategically.  As argued in this paper, important domestic changes have happened in recent years 
for Japan’s regional and global policies, which have accelerated the momentum of Japanese 
engagement in international security and East Asian community building. 
Reportedly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will increase its staff people in charge of FTA 
negotiations from 30 to 90.  The METI minister, Shoichi Nakagawa, is an active member of the 
agricultural tribe of the LDP, but is now committed to strengthening Japan’s engagement in FTA 
negotiations.  After all, the FTA drive will provide a useful momentum for the re-structuring of 
agricultural policy in line with the broader regional strategy of community building propelled by 
FTA and other economic measures. 
It is high time now that Japan move strategically by raising the creation of a stable and prosperous 
regional community as a long-term goal.  Eventually, such a community could and indeed should 
have elements of a security community, where the use of force as means of settling international 
disputes could be regarded legitimate only in multilateral forms and like-minded peoples are 
connected by common values. 
The United States as well as China should be a member of such a community.  Ironically, 
however, the current unilateral tendency of the Bush administration in effect provides a catalyst for 
East Asian countries to come closer, if not to counter the American predominance but to prepare for 
the misuse of its power.    China could pose the same problem, particularly with regard to the use of 
force against Taiwan.     
Ultimately, prudence on the part of the United States and China and a stable strategic relationship 
between them is a necessary condition for building an East Asian community.   Currently, there are 
some favorable conditions, including Chinese policies at least for the time being, encouraging such 
regional trend. Japan should seize this opportunity and move strategically. 